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Abstract. This paper presents a design for an experimentum crucis as to the particular type
of locality found with the binding of variables ranging over so-called concept generators in the
compositional semantics of de re readings of attitude reports (Percus, Sauerland 2003). The
outcome of the experiment would show whether Santorio’s (2014) formulation of the locality
constraint is adequate. If it is not, this will affect his technical proposal. This paper presents
an alternative proposal couched in terms of agreement and thus capable of capturing a more
flexible, relative kind of locality.
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Аннотация. Статья посвящена формальному семантическому анализу высказываний о
пропозициональных установках, интерпретируемых de re. Уже ставший традиционным
анализ, использующий переменные по генераторам концептов (Percus, Sauerland 2003),
перепорождает (Santorio 2014); мы описываем способ, каким можно проверить, адекватно
ли требование локальности означивания этих переменных, сформулированное П. Санто-
рио. В случае отрицательного результата альтернативная формализация, предложенная
Санторио, окажется неадекватной. Мы предлагаем ещё одно решение, основанное на ком-
бинации согласования (в смысле генеративистской теории признаков) и семантики аль-
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1. Concept Generators
Quine (1956) famously introduced double vision scenarios in the study of the semantics
of attitude reports. In particular, both (1a) and (1b) can be truly uttered in a scenario
where Ralph has seen Ortcutt twice under different circumstances without realising
that he was seeing the same man.
(1) a. Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy.
b. Ralph believes that Ortcutt is not a spy.
Kaplan (1968) suggested that each of the reports in (1), if interpreted de re w.r.t.
Ortcutt, is true iff there is a suitable mode of presentation of Ortcutt for Ralph such
that the individual so presented is (resp. is not) a spy in Ralph’s belief worlds; one way
to model this is to say that in each of Ralph’s belief worlds, there are two counterparts—
in Lewis’s (1968) sense—of the actual individual Ortcutt, each presented under a guise
the real Ortcutt has, e.g. ‘the man I [Ralph] saw spying around’ and ‘the man I [Ralph]
saw relaxing at the beach.’
Conceptual arguments, such as the general compositional, step-by-step architecture
adopted by modern formal semantics, as well as empirical evidence, such as the depen-
dence of the choice of the mode of presentation on quantifiers higher in the structure
(Charlow, Sharvit 2014, pace Aloni 2001), point to the necessity of coding the choice
of the mode of presentation in the Logical Form of de re attitude reports. The de facto
default theory to that end is presented in Percus, Sauerland (2003), where, apart from
possible world variables, variables over concept generators (CGs) are added as sister
nodes to terms interpreted de re.
The LF postulated for (1a) on the default analysis is (2a),
(2) a. Ralph believes 𝜆2 𝜆1 [𝑤1 [𝐺2 Ortcutt ] 𝑤1 is.a.spy ]
b. JbelievesK@ = 𝜆𝑝⟨⟨𝑒,⟨𝑠,𝑒⟩⟩,⟨𝑠,𝑡⟩⟩𝜆𝑥.∃𝐺∀𝑤, @𝑅𝑥𝑤 ∶ 𝑝𝑤(𝐺) = 1
c. ∃𝐺2 ⟨𝑒,⟨𝑠,𝑒⟩⟩∀𝑤1, @𝑅Ralph𝑤1 ∶ 𝑆𝑝𝑦𝑤1(𝐺2(𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑡, 𝑤1))
Here 𝜆1 abstracts over the possible world variable—turning the embedded clause se-
mantically from a proposition-in-extension, i.e. a truth-value, into a proposition-in-
intension, i.e. a function from possible worlds to truth values. 𝜆2 abstracts over the
concept generator variable, thereby turning a proposition-in-intension into a function
from CGs to propositions-in-intension. A CG is a function of the type ⟨𝑒, ⟨𝑠, 𝑒⟩⟩ which,
for a given individual (Ortcutt in (2a)), supplies an individual concept—a function
from possible worlds to individuals possessing a certain individuating property each
in its possible world.3 Thus in (2a), the boxed expression will denote the individual
which is the unique bearer at 𝑤1 of a certain property of which Ortcutt is the unique
bearer at @, the actual world. For reasons much discussed since Kaplan, the range
of CG variables such as 𝐺2 is typically restricted to properties involving some kind of
3Throughout the paper, it is assumed that an individual is confined to a particular possible world,
and instead of trans-world identity counterpart relations are used.
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epistemic proximity to, or acquaintance with, the bearer of the property, on behalf of
the speaker (or, in case of deeper embedding, attitude holder); e.g. the property of
being ‘the (only) baby girl I saw in my apartment last Monday’ fits, whereas ‘the baby
girl now located highest from the sea level’ does not.
With both the world and the CG variable abstracted over, the attitude verb is
assumed to quantify over them (2b), so that the interpretation of (2a) will be as in
(2c), which reads: ‘There is a way 𝐺2 to correlate individuals with indivudual concepts
based on Ralph’s acquaintance s.t. (a) Ortcutt is the unique 𝑥 s.t. 𝐺2(𝑥, @) and (b) for
each doxastic alternative 𝑤1 of Ralph at @, the unique 𝑦 s.t. 𝐺2(𝑦, 𝑤1) is a spy at 𝑤1.’
Together with the referring expression whose referent has the relevant mode of
presentation (Ortcutt in (2a)) and the possible world pronoun whose referent is the
world where the individual so presented has to be found (𝑤1 in (2a)), a CG variable
forms a complex that will be boxed for legibility throughout this paper and referred to
as a “CG-shell” (a non-standard but convenient term).
2. Santorio on Locality
Santorio (2010; 2014) has pointed out that the default analysis overgenerates in that a
given CG variable is predicted to be bindable by any attitude verb higher in the struc-
ture, whereas in fact—Santorio argues—it can only be bound by the closest such verb.
(This situation can be viewed as similar to the tension between the apparent need for
overt world pronouns in the syntax and the necessity to restrict their distribution; see
Percus (2000) as a starting point and Schwarz (2012) for a more recent and principled
account.) To see this, consider his
(3) Ralph believes that Ramona believes that Ortcutt is a fly guy.
According to Santorio, (3) does not have a true reading in the following scenario:
Scenario 1. Ralph and Ramona see Ortcutt perform. Ralph is impressed and says
“That guy is a fly guy”; Ramona is unimpressed and says “That guy is not a fly guy.”
Ralph also thinks that Ortcutt, who is exceptionally short, is the shortest fusion drum-
mer that they have ever seen. Ramona disagrees: “You’re wrong. Shortcutt is the
shortest fusion drummer we’ve ever seen, and he, differently from that guy, is fly”
(Santorio 2014, p. 12).
This shows that the CG variable in the CG-shell of Ortcutt in (3) cannot be bound
by the higher attitude verb, i.e. the only LF available is (4a), not (4b).
(4) a. Ralph believes
𝜆4 𝜆3 [ 𝑤3 Ramona believes 𝜆2 𝜆1 [ 𝑤1 [𝐺2 Ortcutt ] 𝑤1 is.a.fly.guy ] ]
b. *Ralph believes
𝜆4 𝜆3 [ 𝑤3 Ramona believes 𝜆2 𝜆1 [ 𝑤1 [𝐺4 Ortcutt ] 𝑤1 is.a.fly.guy ] ]
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Assuming a binding mechanism in the style of Heim, Kratzer (1998),4 where it is
performed by indices in the syntax (represented as 𝜆𝑖 here), this restriction cannot
be accounted for: lambda operators bind at any depth into their scope, interacting
with any coindexed variable therein, just like first-order quantifiers do, and it is as
impossible to preclude the configuration in (4b) as it is to rule out ∃𝑦∃𝑥𝑃(𝑦) once you
allow for ∃𝑦∃𝑥𝑃 (𝑥).
This is why Santorio uses, instead of quantification over explicit variables used in
first-order logic and in the analyses of modality with overt world variables, a kind of
quantification over an implicit variable analogous to the behaviour of traditional modal
operators  and ♦ in modal logic:5 if a subformula is within the scope of a sequence
of such operators, it will be interpreted at the possible worlds introduced by the last
operator in the sequence, e.g.
(5) J♦𝑝K𝑤 = 1 iff ∃𝑤′, 𝑤𝑅𝑤′ ∶ ∀𝑤″, 𝑤′𝑅𝑤″ ∶ J𝑝K𝑤″ = 1.
Likewise, Santorio assumes that attitude verbs quantify over a new kind of assignment,
whose only role is to value CG variables, and simultaneously restrict the range of the
variable to CGs of the attitude holder. Therefore, abstraction over CGs (our 𝜆2 and 𝜆4
in (4)) is not needed, and the interpretation of (3) corresponding to the LF in (4b) is as
in (6), with the new kind of assignment denoted as ℎ (notation differs from Santorio’s).
(6) a. LF: Ralph believes 𝜆3 [ 𝑤3 Ramona believes 𝜆1 [ 𝑤1 𝐺 Ortcutt is.a.fly.guy ] ]
b. JbelievesK@,𝑔 = 𝜆𝑆⟨𝑠,𝑡⟩𝜆𝑥.∃ℎ∀𝑤, @𝑅𝑥𝑤 ∶ J𝑆Kℎ(𝑤) = 1
(abstracting from usual assignments)
c. Interpretation of (6a): ‘For each doxastic alternative 𝑤3 of Ralph at @, there
is a way ℎ to assign Ramona’s CGs to CG variables such that for each doxastic
alternative 𝑤1 of Ramona at 𝑤3, the individual which is ℎ(𝐺) at 𝑤1, where
ℎ(𝐺) is a property Ortcutt has at @, is a fly guy at 𝑤1’
3. Diagnosing for Embedding
Santorio’s proposal, however, is not the only one consistent with the behaviour of
his (3). Apart from absolute locality—that is, the requirement that all CG variables
be valued by the closest attitude verb—one could suggest that we are dealing with
relative locality, i.e. the requirement that at the point of structure-building at which a
CG variable is going to become bound, it has to be bound by the structurally closest
abstractor provided that the closest abstractor does not bind a structurally higher
4As can be seen here, this paper assumes the textbook wisdom that indices are part of the syntactic
representation of a sentence not reducible to any other component of that representation. This is no
longer unchallenged, see e.g. Reuland (2011); as D. Zelenskii points out, viewing indices as product of
syntactic movement or feature checking may provide theoretical resources to exclude the interpetations
unavailable according to Santorio.
5Concerning this distinction, see Fintel, Heim (2011, ch. 8).
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CG variable in the same nominal projection. To my knowledge, this option has not been
systemically investigated. Santorio does not consider it, merely taking for granted that
an actual indivudual (Ortcutt) can be an argument of a CG expression under two layers
of embedding (cf. (7c) below). Moreover, it is not discussed in Tiskin (2016b[b]), which
assumes CGs and deals explicitly with double embeddings. As noticed in a footnote
there, Sudo (2014) has a brief mention of the possibility of intermediate readings with
double embeddings, but both his primary empirical focus and his technical means are
different from ones explored here.
To tell the two kinds of locality apart, we need to construct a scenario where the
only true reading of an attitude report with double embedding could be the one with
nested CG-shells of the form [𝐺𝑖 [𝐺𝑗 𝑎 ] 𝑤𝑘 ] 𝑤𝑚 . This means that other options,
such as directly applying 𝐺𝑖 to 𝑎, have to be excluded as leading to impossible or false
interpretations. The following pair consisting of Scenario 2 and the sentence (7) is an
attempt to provide for this need. However, this paper is not an empirical study, so the
issue of the truth of the pertinent LF in (7d) is not resolved here; the claims of the
following Section 4 are thus conditional on the establishment of its truth.
Scenario 2. On Saturday, Ralph meets the mayor on the beach without knowing who
he is. On Sunday, Ralph gets drunk with his friends and acquires false memories; now
he mistakenly believes that he has taken a funny picture of the notorious man on the
beach and shown the picture to his friend Mary; moreover, he now thinks Mary could
not but conclude that the man in the picture was hilarious.
(7) Ralph believes that Mary thinks that the mayor is hilarious.
a. *Ralph believes 𝜆4 𝜆3 [ 𝑤3 Mary thinks
𝜆2 𝜆1 [ 𝑤1 [𝐺4 [ the @/𝑤3 mayor ]] 𝑤1 is.hilarious ] ]
b. Ralph believes 𝜆4 𝜆3 [ 𝑤3 Mary thinks
𝜆2 𝜆1 [ 𝑤1 [𝐺2 [ the 𝑤3 mayor ]] 𝑤1 is.hilarious ] ]
c. Ralph believes 𝜆4 𝜆3 [ 𝑤3 Mary thinks
𝜆2 𝜆1 [ 𝑤1 [𝐺2 [ the @ mayor ]] 𝑤1 is.hilarious ] ]
d. Ralph believes 𝜆4 𝜆3 [ 𝑤3 Mary thinks
𝜆2 𝜆1 [ 𝑤1 [𝐺2 [𝐺4 [ the @ mayor ]] 𝑤3 ] 𝑤1 is.hilarious ] ]
The LF in (7a) is prohibited by Santorio’s constraint. The remaining options are
considered below.6
6Embedding of coindexed CG variables, as in [𝐺2 [𝐺2 [ the @ mayor ]] 𝑤1 ] 𝑤1 , will be equiva-
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Option I The LF in (7b) is not expected to be true in Scenario 2, given that Ralph
does not know, or even believe, that the individual in question is the mayor.
Option II The LF in (7c) is not expected to be true in Scenario 2, given that there is
no acquaintance relation between Mary7 and any counterpart of the mayor, who is
an actual individual. What Mary is acquainted with (in Ralph’s belief worlds) is a
counterpart of Ralph’s counterpart of the mayor, and a counterpart of a counterpart
of 𝑎 need not be a counterpart of 𝑎 (Lewis 1968).
Option III The remaining option is the LF in (7d). Uncontroversially, Ralph is ac-
quainted with the mayor, therefore in Ralph’s belief worlds there are (acquaintance-
based) counterparts of the mayor. Moreover, Ralph can have a belief about Mary’s
mental state which would be de re w.r.t. Ralph’s counterpart of the mayor, of the
kind ‘Mary believes, of the man I [Ralph] saw on the beach, that he is hilarious.’
Mary’s having of a counterpart of Ralph’s man in each of her belief worlds accessible
from Ralph’s belief worlds is guaranteed by Ralph’s allegedly having shown her a
picture.
Thus, if (7) has a true reading in Scenario 2 at all, it is due to the possibility of
CG-shells embedding one another.
4. Consequences for Locality
If (7) indeed has a true reading in Scenario 2, this will have consequences for the
evaluation of Santorio’s proposal. Given that he operates with assignment shifts, the
assignment will be shifted for the whole most embedded clause, to the effect that all
CG variables there will be restricted to CGs of Mary. However, if our analysis of
Scenario 2 is correct, we should have the possibility of using CGs of a more distant
attitude holder (Ralph) as well, as shown in (7d); therefore, Santorio’s constraint will
have to be restricted—but not abandoned, provided that we still have to rule out (7a).
(8) Santorio’s constraint (revised)
The order of CG-shell embedding should be the mirror image of the embedding
of attitude holders, with the least embedded CG-shell being evaluated with the
CG of the closest holder.
The mechanism responsible for this kind of generalisation can no longer be assignment
shift; neither can it be unrestricted variable binding, for in that case we will lose the
power to predict the unavailability of (7a)-type readings. While I would not like to
preclude the possibility of a semantic (or ontological) analysis of the kind proposed
by Sauerland (2014) for constraints on world variable binding, my proposal explores a
different route.
lent to [𝐺2 [ the @ mayor ]] 𝑤1 , given that I am my own counterpart in the world where I live.
7For simplification I speak about Mary, although, given world-boundedness of all individuals, I would
have to speak about Mary’s counterparts in Ralph’s doxastic alternatives.
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One way to go might be via the syntactic notion of agreement. Suppose CG variables
in the syntax bear an unvalued holder feature [ H : _ ], which requires valuation; the
valued version of the same feature is located on the attitude verb, which in turn gets it
valued from its subject, which denotes the attitude holder. The resulting configuration
for (7d) is
(9) Ralph believes[ H : Ralph ] 𝜆4 𝜆3 [ 𝑤3 Mary thinks[ H : Mary ]
𝜆2 𝜆1 [ 𝑤1 [𝐺2[ H : Mary ] [𝐺4[ H : Ralph ] [ the @ mayor ]] 𝑤3 ] 𝑤1 is.hilarious ] ]
Although initially unvalued, the holder feature on a CG variable will be inter-
pretable, restricting the range of the variable to CGs of the specified holder. What is
thereby gained is the particular type of locality: provided that the necessity of agreeing
𝐺2 first is established on principled grounds, 𝐺2 agrees with the closest attitude verb,
which is Mary’s, and the only option for 𝐺4 would be to agree with the closest atti-
tude verb not yet involved in agreement relations; hence the agreement with Ralph’s
attitude verb in (9).
However, this proposal raises theoretical issues as to the direction and order of
agreement. I am not going to pursue this direction; suffice it to say that for an adequate
treatment of cases where a single embedded clause contains several terms interpreted
de re whose CGs will be linked to the same attitude holder,8 multiple Agree is needed
to provide for the possibility of both CG-shells to be linked to the same attitude verb.
This will also be needed on the account offered here.
Another option is to exploit the idea that a de re reading, or more generally a
transparent reading of whatever kind, involves the activation of semantic alternatives
to the entity whose name is interpreted de re. This intuition has been more clearly
articulated with regard to so-called “third,” or “revisionist” readings of predicates (see
Tiskin 2016a(a) for a discussion of pre-dating work, and Blumberg, Lederman 2020 for
newer developments) but can be extended onto de re readings of terms. Manipulating
sets of alternatives, i.e. sets of semantic entities of the same type, perhaps restricted
by further conditions, is employed for a variety of tasks in semantics, including the
analysis of information structure (Büring 2016) and questions (Kotek 2016); in both
cases mentioned, it is sometimes necessary to manipulate sets of sets of alternatives as
well.
Suppose that, instead of CG variables, we have alternative-inducing operators with
the holder feature. For example, 𝒜𝑤3[ H : Ralph ] Ortcutt will denote, for a given world 𝑤3,
the set of individuals in 𝑤3 linked to the real Ortcutt by Ralph’s different acquaintance-
based counterpart relations:
8As e.g. in The dean believes that Jones scored higher than Smith uttered when the dean’s only
acquaintance relation to Jones is ‘the student whom I saw from the back in Room 345’ and to Smith,
‘the student whom I saw from the back in Room 346.’
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(10) {𝐺(𝑂𝑟𝑡𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑡, 𝑤3) ∣ 𝐺 is for Ralph}
Likewise, 𝒜𝑤1[ H : Mary ] 𝒜
𝑤3
[ H : Ralph ] Ortcutt will denote the set of sets of individuals:
(11) {{𝐺′(𝐺(𝑂𝑟𝑡𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑡, 𝑤3), 𝑤1) ∣ 𝐺 is for Mary} ∣ 𝐺′ is for Ralph}
This denotation is combinable with the more traditional denotation for e.g. is hilarious
via Hamblin’s pointwise functional application, to the effect that the clause
that 𝒜𝑤1[ H : Mary ] 𝒜
𝑤3
[ H : Ralph ] Ortcutt is hilarious
will denote a set of sets of propositions-in-intension:
(12) {{𝜆𝑤.𝐻𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑤(𝐺′(𝐺(𝑂𝑟𝑡𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑡, 𝑤3), 𝑤)) ∣ 𝐺 is for Mary} ∣ 𝐺′ is for Ralph}
An attitude verb, instead of quantifying over CGs (or sequences of CGs,9 as e.g. in
Charlow, Sharvit 2014), quantifies over most deeply embedded alternatives but com-
bines with the higher-level alternatives, Hamblin-style; thus
that Mary thinks that 𝒜𝑤1[ H : Mary ] 𝒜
𝑤3
[ H : Ralph ] Ortcutt is hilarious
will denote the following set of propositions-in-intension:
(13) {𝜆𝑣.∃𝑝 ∈ {∀𝑤, 𝑣𝑅Mary𝑤 ∶ 𝐻𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑤(𝐺′(𝐺(𝑂𝑟𝑡𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑡, 𝑤3), 𝑤))} ∶ 𝑝(𝑣) = 1},
𝐺 is for Mary, 𝐺′ is for Ralph
The subsequent completion with Ralph believes... yields the whole of (7d) with the
interpretation as in
(14) 𝜆𝑢.∃𝑝′ ∈ {∀𝑢, 𝑢𝑅Ralph𝑣 ∶
∃𝑝 ∈ {∀𝑤, 𝑣𝑅Mary𝑤 ∶ 𝐻𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑤(𝐺′(𝐺(𝑂𝑟𝑡𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑡, 𝑣), 𝑤))} ∶ 𝑝(𝑣) = 1} ∶ 𝑝′(𝑢) = 1,
𝐺 is for Mary, 𝐺′ is for Ralph
This captures Santorio’s restriction if we assume that e.g. Ralph’s counterparts are
defined only in worlds accessible for Ralph, so that the indexings such as in (7a) would
require that Mary’s counterparts by acquaintance have properties at worlds where they
do not exist. (I am assuming that the set of Mary’s alternatives accessible from Ralph’s
alternatives does not intersect, let alone coincide, with the set of Mary’s alternatives
9Alongside with Santorio’s assignment shift, the present proposal helps avoid the problem which
arises on the standard CG-based account: the attitude verb as a lexical entry does not see how many
terms read de re the embedded clause contains and therefore has to quantify over sequences of CGs of
any finite length, one for each term. To the contrary, on the present proposal the alternatives stemming
from different terms compose into a single set of propositional alternatives over which the attitude
verb quantifies. Thanks to the anonymous reviewer for their enquiry concerning the benefits of the
alternative-based proposal.
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accessible directly from @ or with the set of Ralph’s alternatives at @; this is basically
the requirement that only tree-like modal frames be used—that no world is accessible
from more than one other world; see Tiskin 2016b(b) for the motivation of applying
tree frames to the analysis of attitude reports.) At the same time this accounts for
the restriction’s more permissive version in (8) because Ralph’s alternatives are for
the time being protected from entering the semantic composition by another level, i.e.
Mary’s alternatives, and enter it only when Ralph’s own attitude verb is merged.
To see how this proposal works, consider an example. Suppose that, in Scenario 2,
Ralph stands in two suitable acquaintance relations to the mayor, producing two indi-
vidual concepts, 𝑓 ′1 = ‘the man I [Ralph] saw on the beach’ and 𝑓 ′2 = ‘the man I [Ralph]
saw in the local newspaper.’ Given that Ralph does not know whether the two descrip-
tions are coreferential, in some of his doxastic alternatives 𝑤3, 𝑓 ′1(𝑤3) ≠ 𝑓 ′2(𝑤3); in
such worlds, there will be two counterparts of the actual mayor. From each of Ralph’s
doxastic alternatives a set of Mary’s10 doxastic alternatives are accessible. Given that
Ralph does not think he told Mary anything about the man in the local paper, Mary
will only have counterparts of 𝑓 ′1(𝑤3) in each of her worlds 𝑤1 accessible from a given
𝑤3 of Ralph. However, nothing precludes Mary from having more than one counter-
part of 𝑓 ′1(𝑤3) in some of her doxastic alternatives, e.g. if in some 𝑤3’s Ralph tells
her two different stories about the man on the beach and Mary fails to identify the
protagonists. Therefore, in a given 𝑤1 accessible from a given 𝑤3 there might be two
distinct individuals, 𝑓1(𝑤1) and 𝑓2(𝑤1) for some individual concepts 𝑓1 and 𝑓2 based












Figure 1: The frame for our example (only some doxastic alternatives shown). Solid
arrows: accessibility relations; dashed arrows: counterpart relations, pointing from the
counterpart to the prototype.
Let us interpret (15), the version of (7d) with alternative generators, in this setting;
this is done in (16).
10More precisely, of Mary’s counterpart in that world; see fn. 7.
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(15) Ralph believes
𝜆3 [ 𝑤3 Mary thinks 𝜆1 [ 𝑤1 𝒜𝑤1[ H : Mary ] 𝒜
𝑤3
[ H : Ralph ] the @ mayor is.hilarious ] ]
(16) a. J 𝒜𝑤3[ H : Ralph ] the @ mayor K = {𝑓 ′1(𝑤3), 𝑓 ′2(𝑤3)}
b. J 𝒜𝑤1[ H : Mary ] 𝒜𝑤3[ H : Ralph ] the @ mayor K = {{𝑓1(𝑤1), 𝑓2(𝑤1)}, ∅},
because 𝑓 ′1(𝑤3) has two counterparts at 𝑤1 and 𝑓 ′2(𝑤3) has none
c.
q
𝜆1 [ 𝑤1 𝒜𝑤1[ H : Mary ] 𝒜
𝑤3







𝜆3 [ 𝑤3 Mary thinks
𝜆1 [ 𝑤1 𝒜𝑤1[ H : Mary ] 𝒜
𝑤3
[ H : Ralph ] the @ mayor is.hilarious ]
z
=
{𝜆𝑣.∃𝑝 ∈ {∀𝑤, 𝑣𝑅Mary𝑤 ∶ 𝐻𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑤(𝑓1(𝑤)),∀𝑤, 𝑣𝑅Mary𝑤 ∶ 𝐻𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑤(𝑓2(𝑤))
} ∶ 𝑝(𝑣) = 1,
𝜆𝑣.∃𝑝 ∈ ∅ ∶ 𝑝(𝑣) = 1}
e.
r
Ralph believes 𝜆3 [ 𝑤3 Mary thinks
𝜆1 [ 𝑤1 𝒜𝑤1[ H : Mary ] 𝒜
𝑤3






∀𝑣, 𝑢𝑅Ralph𝑣 ∶ ∃𝑝′ ∈ {
∀𝑤, 𝑣𝑅Mary𝑤 ∶ 𝐻𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑤(𝑓1(𝑤)),
∀𝑤, 𝑣𝑅Mary𝑤 ∶ 𝐻𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑤(𝑓2(𝑤))
} ∶ 𝑝(𝑣) = 1,





Given that the role of 𝑢 is played by @, let us check whether (16e) is true at @. For it
to be true, there has to be an alternative among those in outermost brackets such that
it is true; given that the empty set does not contain any proposition-in-intension 𝑝′,
this should be the first alternative. In its turn, it is true iff for each Ralph’s doxastic
alternative 𝑣 at 𝑢 there is a proposition-in-intension 𝑝 from the innermost bracketed
set s.t. it is true at 𝑣. In Scenario 2, Ralph believes that Mary has got acquainted with
the man he had seen on the beach and thinks he is hilarious, therefore either 𝑓1(𝑤) or
𝑓2(𝑤) (or both) will satisfy 𝐻𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 at each 𝑤 accessible for Mary from 𝑣 (e.g. in 𝑤1
in Figure 1). Thus the innermost existentially quantified statement of (16e) holds at
each 𝑣, therefore the outermost existentially quantified statement holds true at @.
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ЛОГИКА СЕГОДНЯ
5. Conclusion
This paper has pointed out that Santorio’s “intensional” assignment shift analysis of
concept generators in attitude reports may be insufficiently flexible, and provided a
sample scenario for the future empirical testing of this hypothesis. Moreover, I at-
tempted to construct an alternative analysis, whose main components are: (a) feature-
based linking of concept generator-inducing expressions to attitude verbs; (b) an al-
ternative semantics for counterparts; (c) ontological assumptions about frames: unde-
finedness of counterparts of by 𝑥’s acquaintance in worlds inaccessible for the holder
𝑥, and strict tree-like architecture of frames. This alternative analysis can be applied
if the critical scenario provided a negative result for Santorio’s analysis.
References
Aloni 2001 — Aloni M. Quantification under conceptual covers : PhD thesis / Aloni Maria.
ILLC, University of Amsterdam, 2001.
Blumberg, Lederman 2020 — Blumberg K., Lederman H. Revisionist reporting // Philosoph-
ical Studies. 2020.
Büring 2016 — Büring D. (Contrastive) Topic // The Oxford Handbook of Information Struc-
ture. Oxford University Press, 2016. P. 64–85.
Charlow, Sharvit 2014 — Charlow S., Sharvit Y. Bound ‘de re’ pronouns and the LFs of
attitude reports // Semantics and Pragmatics. 2014. Vol. 7, no. 1. P. 1–43.
Fintel, Heim 2011 — Fintel K. von, Heim I. Intensional Semantics / Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. 2011. URL: http://web.mit.edu/fintel/fintel-heim-intensional.pdf.
Heim, Kratzer 1998 — Heim I., Kratzer A. Semantics in Generative Grammar. Oxford: Black-
well, 1998.
Kaplan 1968 — Kaplan D. Quantifying in // Synthese. 1968. Vol. 19, no. 1/2. P. 178–214.
Kotek 2016 — Kotek H. On the semantics of wh-questions // Proceedings of Sinn und Be-
deutung. Vol. 20. 2016. P. 430–447.
Lewis 1968 — Lewis D. Counterpart theory and quantified modal logic // Journal of Philos-
ophy. 1968. Vol. 65, no. 5. P. 113–126.
Percus 2000 — Percus O. Constraints on some other variables in syntax // Natural Language
Semantics. 2000. Vol. 8, no. 3. P. 173–229.
Percus, Sauerland 2003 — Percus O., Sauerland U. On the LFs of attitude reports // Pro-
ceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung. Vol. 7. 2003. P. 228–242.
Quine 1956 — Quine W. V. O. Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes // Journal of Philos-
ophy. 1956. Vol. 53, no. 5. P. 177–187.
Reuland 2011 — Reuland E. Syntax and interpretation systems: How is their labour di-
vided? // The Oxford Handbook of Linguistic Minimalism. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011. P. 377–395.
Santorio 2010 — Santorio P. Modals are monsters: on indexical shift in English // Proceedings
of SALT. Vol. 20. 2010. P. 289–308.
Логико-философские штудии. ISSN 2223-3954 247
Daniel Tiskin. How Much Locality with Concept Generators?
Santorio 2014 — Santorio P. On the Plurality of Indices. 2014. URL: http://paolosantorio.
net/opi.draft3b.pdf.
Sauerland 2014 — Sauerland U. Counterparts Block Some ‘De Re’ Readings // The Art and
Craft of Semantics: A Festschrift for Irene Heim. Vol. 2. MITWPL, 2014. P. 65–85.
Schwarz 2012 — Schwarz F. Situation pronouns in determiner phrases // Natural Language
Semantics. 2012. Vol. 20, no. 4. P. 431–475.
Sudo 2014 — Sudo Y. On De Re Predicates // Proceedings of WCCFL 31. 2014. P. 447–456.
Tiskin 2016a — Tiskin D. Conditional attitude ascription // Epistemology & Philosophy of
Science. 2016a(a). Vol. 50, no. 4. P. 74–93.
Tiskin 2016b — Tiskin D. Transparent readings and privileged worlds // Logical Investiga-
tions. 2016b(b). Vol. 22, no. 2. P. 73–90.
248 Логико-философские штудии. Том 18 (№3), 2020
